These Attacks Will Keep Coming

Summary of These Attacks Will Keep Coming

by Sarah Adams

25m•March 10, 2026
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Overview of These Attacks Will Keep Coming (The Watch Floor — Sarah Adams)

Sarah Adams argues states must build their own counterintelligence and counterterrorism capacities because federal systems are fragmented, slow, and create gaps that adversaries exploit. She highlights Florida’s new bill (HB 945) to create a statewide counterintelligence and counterterrorism unit as a model other states could adapt. Through anecdotes, case examples, and a practical breakdown of capabilities, Adams urges immediate state-level ownership of local threats to protect citizens and critical infrastructure.

Key points and main takeaways

  • Federal agencies do important work but leave gaps; states should not wait for Washington to fix local threats.
  • Florida’s HB 945 would establish a statewide counterintelligence and counterterrorism unit that combines analysis, information-sharing, and operational capability.
  • State-level teams can provide faster, more context-aware detection, disruption, and prosecution of threats (terrorist, foreign intelligence, transnational criminal networks).
  • Practical capabilities include pattern mapping, persistent counterintelligence, integrated liaison architecture, expert analysts, operational arrest/disruption teams, and institutional memory.
  • Many sectors are at risk at the state level: ports, universities/research, military bases, energy and supply chains, tourism hubs, and biotech/innovation centers.
  • Other states can adapt Florida’s model to their primary threat vectors (e.g., border smuggling in Texas, ports and tech in California, energy infrastructure in Pennsylvania).

How the Florida bill (HB 945) would work

Core goals

  • Give the state “its own eyes and ears” with an analytic and operational capability focused on counterintelligence and counterterrorism.
  • Coordinate across counties and agencies and share timely intelligence with local law enforcement and federal partners.
  • Shift culture from reactive to proactive threat-hunting and mitigation.

Core functions and authorities

  • Intelligence analysis: pattern-mapping across jurisdictions (travel, purchases, partnerships, money flows).
  • Persistent counterintelligence: tracking foreign adversary influence, espionage, and quiet preparatory activity.
  • Integrated liaison architecture: streamlined information sharing both up to federal partners and down to local agencies.
  • Operational teams: arrest and disruption authority to act immediately on locally developed intelligence.
  • Institutional memory: maintain continuity and expertise across administrations.

Examples and anecdotes used to support the case

  • DHS website anomaly: searching “terrorism tip” directed Adams to a local hurricane office in Tampa as the contact for terrorism tips—used to illustrate poor public-facing guidance and fractured responsibilities.
  • Personal reports: Adams describes being told a sheriff’s office wouldn’t accept a terrorism tip by phone (later corrected with the sheriff), illustrating inconsistent local intake procedures.
  • Historic incidents illustrating value of local awareness:
    • 9/11 (federal gaps)
    • Boston Marathon (2013): local officers saw suspicious activity before federal consolidation
    • San Bernardino (2015): local indicators that may have offered early warnings
    • New Orleans attacker (Shamsuddin Jabber referenced): cited as a case where casing occurred in Tampa but the attack happened elsewhere—raising questions about local detection and information consolidation
  • Ongoing threats examples: al-Qaeda facilitator networks in the 2000s, casing incidents in 2024–2025, foreign targeting of universities (esp. by China).

Recommended state-level capabilities and actions

  • Create a dedicated statewide counterintelligence/counterterrorism unit (analysts + operatives).
  • Implement pattern-mapping tools to connect cross-jurisdictional dots (financial flows, travel, purchases).
  • Build persistent counterintelligence programs to track influence and espionage, not just kinetic attack indicators.
  • Develop an integrated liaison and information-sharing system (apps or portals that serve both federal→state→local and state→local→federal flows).
  • Position analysts with domain expertise (ports, energy, biotech, military support facilities, universities).
  • Ensure operational authority and pathways so intelligence flows directly to local law enforcement for rapid action when needed.
  • Preserve institutional memory—structures that survive political transitions and maintain continuity of expertise.

Notable quotes and insights

  • “If someone’s not doing it, someone has to do it. So why not take responsibility on the state level?”
  • “Florida can never be a soft target.”
  • Practical insight: local, long-tenured officers frequently have context that short-term federal investigators do not—state units leverage that institutional knowledge.

Potential challenges and considerations

  • Costs and resources: training, hiring analysts and operators, and technology are expensive.
  • Political risk and jurisdictional friction: states must define clear authorities and coordinate with federal partners (avoid duplication or turf battles).
  • Civil liberties and oversight: state intelligence activities require safeguards, transparency, legal frameworks, and judicial/legislative oversight to protect privacy and rights.
  • Need for standardized intake and public-facing guidance so citizens know where to report credible threats.

Action items / Call to action for listeners

  • Use Florida’s HB 945 as a template to advocate for similar state capacity in your state legislature.
  • Push for clear, reliable local reporting channels for terrorism and espionage tips.
  • Encourage local leaders to prioritize counterintelligence for critical infrastructure: ports, universities, military-adjacent communities, and research hubs.
  • Demand transparency on how intelligence is shared between federal, state, and local agencies and insist on mechanisms for timely dissemination.

Conclusion

Sarah Adams makes a practical, urgent argument: states can and should fill the intelligence and counterterrorism gaps that persist at the federal level. By adopting structured, well-resourced statewide counterintelligence and counterterrorism units—modeled on Florida’s HB 945—states can detect threats sooner, act faster, and better protect citizens and critical infrastructure.