Summary of Trump finds it’s easier to start a war than to end one

Overview of Rachman Review — Trump finds it’s easier to start a war than to end one

This Financial Times Rachman Review episode (host Gideon Rachman) examines the Iran war through military and diplomatic lenses. Guests Michael Singh and Dana Stoll (both at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy) discuss the Trump administration’s aims and constraints, military options and limits, the effects of a U.S. naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s internal politics (notably the IRGC), mediation efforts in Pakistan, and the role Europe and the UN could play. The central theme: beginning kinetic campaigns is often easier than devising a credible, lawful, sustainable exit strategy.

Key takeaways

• The Trump White House wants the conflict over quickly but lacks a clear, sustainable endgame; this risks repeating Iraq/Afghanistan-style “secondary effects” that prolong wars.
• Military options exist (expanded bombing, ground invasion, targeting infrastructure) but carry legal, moral and strategic costs; some proposed escalations would risk international isolation and possible war-crimes accusations.
• The U.S. naval blockade and “economic fury” campaign aim to coerce Tehran, but they may hurt Iranian civilians, global markets, and might not move Iran’s leadership to compromise.
• Iran retains asymmetric escalation cards (missiles, drones, proxies like the Houthis, cyber, attacks on regional infrastructure) and a partially intact strike capability.
• Pakistan has emerged as a key mediator; Europe, NATO and multilateral institutions (UN Security Council) could be decisive if the U.S. manages coordinated diplomacy and a legitimizing mandate.
• Domestic political and economic pressures (rising energy prices, supply disruptions) could constrain U.S. options and increase political fracturing at home.

Military perspective (what’s feasible and risky)

• Options discussed:
  • Limited strikes: sustained bombing of military sites (missile/drone/command-and-control) — costly in time and patience but legally tenable.
  • Ground invasion: high risk of casualties and long-term occupation burdens.
  • Targeting civilian infrastructure (power grids, bridges): would inflict major civilian harm, risk war-crimes allegations, and further isolate the U.S.
• Legal and institutional constraints: DoD lawyers and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs are supposed to advise on law of armed conflict and sustainability, creating tension with administration rhetoric favoring maximal lethality.
• Operational reality in the Strait of Hormuz: opening it permanently would likely require a continuous, resource-intensive multinational naval and air presence (escorts, boarding teams, ISR), not a one-off operation.

Diplomatic & political calculus

• Two competing pressure strategies in the U.S. approach: “military/epic fury” vs “economic fury” (blockade + sanctions).
• A possible pragmatic (minimalist) deal: lift the blockade and stop bombing in exchange for reopening the strait, with other issues deferred — unattractive but potentially stabilizing.
• Pakistan’s mediating role: Pakistan is actively shuttling messages and convened regional foreign ministers in Islamabad; seen as a pragmatic, middle-power conduit.
• Europe and the UN:
  • Coordinated action with Europe would strengthen legitimacy and operational capacity (naval contributions, technical nuclear expertise).
  • A UN Security Council resolution could frame freedom of navigation as a global norm and broaden coalition support — but getting one is politically fraught given Russia/China positions and current U.S. skepticism toward multilateral institutions.
• Domestic U.S. politics: rising energy prices and supply shocks increase pressure on Republicans and Democrats; Democrats are broadly unified in criticizing the administration and could exploit any perceived strategic failure.

Iran’s internal dynamics and escalation risks

• IRGC influence: the Revolutionary Guard benefited economically from sanctions-era distortions and has grown politically powerful; hardliners may prefer continued confrontation to preserve influence.
• Fragmented Iranian delegation to talks may reflect multiple power centers and mutual distrust; risk of spoilers inside Iran who oppose concessions.
• Iran’s asymmetric toolkit: remaining missile/drone capacity, proxies (e.g., Houthis), cyber and covert attacks, and the option to intermittently disrupt maritime traffic again — meaning any reopening of the strait could be temporary unless deterrence/assurance mechanisms are durable.

Likely scenarios and outcomes

• Short-term ceasefire/diplomatic outcome: Pakistan-mediated talks could produce a narrow deal to reopen the strait while deferring nuclear and broader issues — likely fragile.
• Prolonged conflict: if coercive measures (blockade, sanctions, limited bombing) fail, the U.S. faces a long, resource-intensive campaign to contain Iran’s asymmetric responses.
• Escalation: miscalculated threats or attacks on civilian infrastructure could provoke regional backlash, international isolation, and greater economic disruption.
• Multilateral route: building a coalition and securing UN backing increases legitimacy and burden-sharing, and could deter Iranian escalation more effectively than unilateral action.

Action items / watchlist (for policymakers, analysts, investors)

• Short-term indicators to monitor:
  • Status of the Strait of Hormuz (closures / reopenings), naval deployments, and coalition naval planning in Europe.
  • Outcomes of Pakistan-mediated talks in Islamabad and any written agreements.
  • Iranian domestic signals: IRGC posture, leadership transitions, public protests, and evidence of factional splits.
  • Energy market indicators: Brent/WTI prices, tanker insurance rates, regional supply disruptions.
  • UN Security Council diplomacy and European naval mission proposals.
• For investors: heightened price volatility in energy markets, shipping and insurance, and supply-chain risks for energy-intensive sectors.
• For policymakers: prioritize coalition-building (Europe, Asian partners), consider realistic long-term maritime-security plans for the Gulf, and prepare legal/moral frameworks for any escalation to avoid isolation.

Notable quotes

• Michael Singh: “Getting yourself out of war is always harder than getting yourself into it.”
• Dana Stoll: “This tension about lethality or what’s within international law or our own laws is something that’s very live within the U.S. system.”
• On strategy: “If you want to avoid an endless war, you need a strategy which is really built for the long haul.”

Bottom line

The episode argues that the Trump administration faces a common paradox: initiating force is simpler than creating a credible, lawful, and sustainable end-state. Military escalation risks law-of-war violations and strategic blowback; economic and naval pressure may harm civilians and global markets without guaranteeing Iranian concessions. The most durable path combines patient, multilateral coercion and diplomacy — backed by realistic expectations about costs, long-term deployments, and the need to work with allies and international institutions.