Summary — “What chance for Trump’s Gaza peace plan?” (Rachman Review, Financial Times)

Overview

• Gideon Rachman interviews Philip Gordon (Brookings; former Obama/Harris administration official) about the feasibility of Donald Trump’s 20‑point Gaza peace plan.
• The discussion evaluates whether the plan can deliver a ceasefire, hostage releases, Hamas disarmament, a multinational peacekeeping force, Gaza reconstruction, and a pathway toward Palestinian statehood — and how political incentives (in the U.S., Israel and the Palestinians) shape prospects.

Key points and main takeaways

• Full implementation of the 20‑point plan is unlikely. The plan’s core demands (Hamas disarmament, no Hamas role in governance, Arab peacekeepers, reconstruction and a political path to statehood) are difficult to reconcile in practice.
• More plausible near‑term outcome: a limited hostage deal and temporary pause/ceasefire. Gordon sees a “decent chance” of a short‑term pause that allows hostage releases and humanitarian relief — but not guaranteed nor permanent.
• Fundamental impasse: a “vicious circle” — Israel will not fully withdraw until Hamas is disarmed; Hamas will not disarm without guarantees and Israeli withdrawal. That contradiction makes a durable settlement improbable without compromise.
• Trump’s leverage differs from past Democratic presidents: his control of the Republican Party and lack of domestic constraints potentially give him unique room to press Israel and Arab states. But Gordon cautions the narrative that Trump has “twisted Bibi’s arm” is premature; much of the recent history showed limited U.S. pressure during humanitarian crises.
• Netanyahu’s calculus is twofold: security (insistence on Hamas defeat/disarmament) and domestic politics (coalition pressures, upcoming election, corruption trials). Political incentives may eventually push him toward a deal if it can be presented as a victory.
• Palestinian Authority (PA) exclusion is a problem. The plan’s reference to “Palestinian technocrats” is vague; the PA, despite flaws, is the only existing Palestinian institution that could plausibly help govern Gaza post‑conflict.
• Multinational Arab peacekeepers are politically and practically difficult: Arab states are reluctant to undertake combat roles, demand U.S. involvement, and place conditions (e.g., Hamas already neutralized) that are often unrealistic.
• Two‑state language appears in the plan but only as an aspirational or conditional reference — not a concrete commitment. The international return to two‑state rhetoric continues largely because alternatives (annexation, apartheid‑style arrangements, a failed one‑state solution) are worse.

Notable quotes and insights

• Donald Trump (as cited at start): “I think we have a chance this week or next week.”
• Philip Gordon on the plan’s realistic prospects: “If you are asking whether this 20‑point peace plan will be fully implemented as drafted... No. I think the prospects for that are very, very limited.”
• Gordon framing the core problem: “You have this sort of vicious circle where you can't meet both of those conditions at the same time.” (Hamas disarmament vs Israeli withdrawal)
• On the lack of credible alternatives to two‑state diplomacy: “The absence of alternatives to a two‑state solution is what kept driving us... and I think still today, drives people back to some version of a Palestinian state.”
• Analogy to past compromises: partial acceptance of de facto armed groups (e.g., Hezbollah in Lebanon) — “accepted in principle” disarmament that is imperfect in practice.

Topics discussed

• Details and realism of Trump’s 20‑point Gaza plan
• Likelihood of hostage releases and temporary vs long‑term ceasefires
• Hamas disarmament feasibility and governance alternatives (Palestinian technocrats vs PA)
• Israel’s political constraints under Benjamin Netanyahu (security vs domestic politics)
• Trump’s unique leverage/political space vs Biden/Obama administrations
• Role and willingness of Arab/Muslim states to provide peacekeepers
• Humanitarian situation and reconstruction needs in Gaza
• The two‑state solution’s continued centrality and its practical limits
• Historical comparisons (previous ceasefires; Hezbollah in Lebanon)

Action items / recommendations (practical steps implied by the discussion)

• Prioritize achievable short‑term goals: negotiate limited hostage swaps, a pause sufficient for humanitarian relief and to create momentum for broader talks.
• Use U.S. leverage actively: Washington should credibly condition support to press Israeli leaders to accept compromises needed for a pause or deal (and to secure Arab participation).
• Involve the Palestinian Authority pragmatically: rather than excluding the PA outright, incorporate it as the only realistic institutional partner for governance/administration in Gaza, while addressing corruption and reform needs.
• Prepare for imperfect disarmament models: design verification and phased arrangements (accepting some residual armed presence while preventing re‑armament) rather than insisting on total, immediate decommissioning.
• Build realistic peacekeeper frameworks: secure clear commitments from Arab states with robust U.S./international backing, defined mandates, and staged entry conditions tied to verified de‑escalation.
• Set realistic public expectations: avoid presenting the plan as full “peace in the Middle East”; communicate likely intermediate benchmarks (hostage releases, humanitarian access, temporary ceasefire) as primary successes.
• Plan for reconstruction and long‑term political steps: link humanitarian aid and reconstruction to transparent governance arrangements and measurable Palestinian reforms that create a credible, later pathway toward statehood.

Bottom line

• A full, clean implementation of Trump’s 20‑point plan is unlikely in the near term because of irreconcilable security and political demands. The most attainable and meaningful near‑term gains are limited hostage deals and temporary ceasefires — which, if achieved, would still represent significant humanitarian and political relief. Long‑term peace will require painful compromises, credible U.S. diplomacy, Arab involvement, and a practical role for the Palestinian Authority.