Formidable US firepower fails to unseat Iran’s regime

Summary of Formidable US firepower fails to unseat Iran’s regime

by Financial Times

33m•March 12, 2026
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Overview of Rachman Review — "Formidable US firepower fails to unseat Iran’s regime"

This episode of the Financial Times' Rachman Review (host Gideon Rachman) features Sir Simon Gass (former British ambassador to Iran and ex‑chair of the UK Joint Intelligence Committee) discussing the immediate aftermath and strategic implications of a major US/Israeli strike campaign on Iran, the succession of a new supreme leader (Mojtaba Khamenei in the episode), Iran’s capacity to continue fighting, and the regional and diplomatic fallout.

Key points and main takeaways

  • Leadership and succession

    • The Assembly of Experts picked a hardline candidate (Mojtaba Khamenei) under wartime conditions; he has strong links to the IRGC.
    • Judging the new supreme leader’s long‑term stance is still uncertain because public information about him is limited.
    • The role of the supreme leader is as much about managing competing power centres as exercising unilateral authority.

  • Power structure inside Iran

    • Sir Simon identifies three main centres of power: (1) the Supreme Leader’s office (patronage, appointments, wealth), (2) the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — military and major economic interests, and (3) the civilian government (weaker, focused on the economy).
    • Decapitation strikes aimed to disrupt leadership but have not broken regime cohesion; built‑in redundancy and a culture of defiance helped Iran continue striking back.

  • Military dynamics and the US/Israeli campaign

    • US and Israeli forces can do enormous damage (thousands of targets reportedly hit early on), but destroying Iran’s dispersed missile, drone, and launch infrastructure entirely is challenging.
    • Iran’s asymmetric leverage—most importantly its ability to threaten shipping through the Strait of Hormuz—remains central to its deterrent and bargaining power.
    • “You don’t need to physically close the strait; you need to make shipping and insurers avoid it” — even intermittent harassment can spike energy prices.

  • Nuclear program and threshold status

    • Before major strikes, Iran had the technical capacity to produce highly enriched uranium relatively quickly but likely lacked full weaponization/delivery capability.
    • Iran has pursued a “threshold” strategy: stay close to weapons capability without necessarily weaponizing—partly to avoid the fate of states that gave up such programs.
    • Damage to centrifuge infrastructure and intense Western/Israeli intelligence scrutiny make rapid reconstitution difficult; renewed nuclear moves would likely invite retaliation.

  • Domestic politics and public opinion inside Iran

    • Widespread protests existed prior to the war (economic grievances and political demands), but they have not coalesced into a viable replacement force — no strong unifying leaders and severe regime repression.
    • The strike campaign risks fueling anti‑American sentiment among Iranians who resent external military action, even if they dislike their rulers.

  • Diplomacy, legality and allied responses

    • Sir Simon argues Britain’s refusal to join combat operations was legally defensible and politically prudent; he warns against sidelining international law.
    • He criticizes the degraded state readiness of British forces and asks whether pre‑positioning might have been possible.
    • Diplomacy between Iran and the US looks unlikely in the near term because of broken trust (e.g., US withdrawal from the JCPOA) and the dominance of IRGC hardliners.
    • Gulf states will be angry with Iran for attacks on their infrastructure but also reassess the reliability and utility of US/Israeli security guarantees.

Notable quotes and insights

  • “The Iranian system is built on a concept of defiance and opposition to the United States.”
  • “It’s much easier to start a war than it is to finish it reliably.”
  • “Intelligence is like a street lamp on a darkly lit road — it casts pools of light but not everything is visible.”
  • Strategic leverage is often asymmetric: disrupting global oil flows or raising insurance costs can be as effective as direct military confrontation.

What to watch (implications & indicators)

  • Oil markets and strategic reserve releases — large, sustained oil price increases will pressure the US (and shape the length of the campaign).
  • Shipping disruptions and insurance/charterer behavior in the Strait of Hormuz — even limited harassment can have outsized effects.
  • IRGC operations and proxy actions across the region (Iraq, Lebanon, Gulf states).
  • Signs of nuclear reconstitution: centrifuge rebuilding, movement of nuclear assets, or underground relocation.
  • Political stability inside Iran after the fighting: renewed street protests (largely economic), elite cohesion, and any cracks within the IRGC or clerical establishment.
  • Gulf states’ diplomatic moves — whether pragmatic engagement with Iran resumes and how they recalibrate ties with the US and Israel.
  • US domestic politics: President Trump’s electoral calculus and willingness to sustain operations amid economic fallout.

Bottom line

Sir Simon Gass argues that despite the scale of US/Israeli strikes, Iran’s political‑military system remains resilient. The most consequential Iranian lever is asymmetric disruption of oil flows via the Strait of Hormuz. The episode stresses uncertainty: military power can inflict damage, but regime survival, regional dynamics, energy markets, and the limits of intelligence and diplomacy mean outcomes are unpredictable and likely to include recurrent flare‑ups rather than a decisive, quick resolution.