Overview of The making of the modern Middle East
In this episode of the Financial Times’ Rachman Review, Gideon Rachman speaks with historian Simon Sebag Montefiore, author of The Cauldron: The Making of the Modern Middle East. The conversation traces the region’s modern history—from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to the rise of Turkey, Arab nationalism, Israel, Iran, and the fading but still potent role of the United States. Montefiore argues that the Middle East remains a “cauldron” because it is a crossroads of competing religions, ethnicities, and ideologies, and that its current turbulence is part of a much longer pattern rather than a new anomaly.
Historical framework: how the modern Middle East was formed
The Ottoman Empire was not simply a model of harmony
Montefiore pushes back against romanticized views of the Ottoman Empire as a stable, tolerant order. He notes that it went through different phases, including periods of repression and violence, and that its end was marked by atrocities against Armenians, Maronites, and Pontic Greeks. He points to the Tanzimat reforms as a genuine period of relative tolerance, but says later Ottoman leaders increasingly used ethnic divisions to maintain power.
The end of empire led to outside carve-up
The collapse of the Ottomans in World War I opened the way for British and French intervention. Montefiore explains that Sykes-Picot mattered not because it fully came into force, but because it symbolized the broader imperial project of dividing the region. He also highlights how Russia originally figured in these plans, even as a potential power in Palestine and Constantinople, before the 1917 انقلاب changed everything.
Atatürk created a new Turkish state through war
One of Montefiore’s central figures is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who defeated French, Armenian, and Greek forces and forced the British to back down at Chanak. This created modern Turkey and established the borders later recognized at Lausanne. Montefiore notes that today’s Turkish leadership still gestures toward neo-Ottoman influence, especially in places like Syria, Libya, Somalia, and Central Asia.
Arab nationalism, Nasser, and the limits of pan-Arab power
Nasser was charismatic, but his project failed
Montefiore describes Gamal Abdel Nasser as brilliant, funny, and gifted as a mass leader, but ultimately a poor strategist. He says Nasser’s rule helped build the modern Egyptian police state, hollowed out Egypt’s cosmopolitan society, and culminated in the disastrous 1967 Six-Day War. Nasser later concluded that a new war with Israel would only bring more defeat.
Why Arabs were often not the dominant regional power
Despite being the majority population in the Middle East, Arabs have rarely been the dominant power bloc. Montefiore says the region has successively been shaped by Ottomans, Europeans, Americans, Turks, Persians, and Israelis, while Arab states themselves were mostly newly created and politically fragile. He argues that many of these states have now had decades of independence and must be judged by their own choices, not only by colonial history.
Israel, the Nakba, and the region’s enduring fault lines
Israel is both a product of state formation and a regional trauma
Montefiore frames Israel’s creation in 1948 as part of the same post-Ottoman breakup that created Turkey and other modern states. He argues that the UN partition plan was unworkable, and that the ensuing war was a desperate struggle for survival for very new and inexperienced Arab states.
The Nakba remains central
He emphasizes that the Nakba—the displacement of roughly 750,000 فلسطينيين—remains a deep and unresolved grievance. While the scale of death was smaller than other 20th-century population catastrophes, its political and emotional impact remains enormous because the dispossession has never been fully resolved.
Israel’s internal contradictions are now a major risk
Montefiore says Israel is stronger than ever in some respects, especially militarily and technologically, but also faces serious internal vulnerabilities:
- growing polarization and social schism
- dependence on a liberal talent base
- the rise of extremist or supremacist politics
- the influence of militias and hardline settlers on state policy
His warning is blunt: a state cannot be built permanently on war.
Iran, militias, and the rise of non-state power
Iran could emerge stronger
Montefiore argues that Iran may actually come out of current turmoil more powerful, especially if it can exploit regional instability and control strategic chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. He sees Iran as one of the region’s historically durable states, even if it remains internally divided and vulnerable.
Militias are reshaping states across the region
A major theme of the discussion is the rise of para-states and militias—in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and increasingly within Israel itself. Montefiore warns that if armed ideological factions gain lasting influence over formal institutions, the state system becomes fragile from within.
Apocalyptic politics matter
He also explains the significance of Mahdism in Iranian politics: a belief that history will culminate in a messianic upheaval and the return of the hidden 12th Imam. In his view, this apocalyptic worldview is one reason Iranian strategists may think in very long time horizons and have disdain for erratic Western policy.
The future: American power, regional realignment, and a bigger geopolitical map
The American era is weakening, but not over
Montefiore says the U.S. period of dominance in the Middle East may be ending, or at least becoming less reliable. America can still project overwhelming force when it chooses to, but regional actors no longer trust it fully and are increasingly hedging their bets.
Regional theatres are merging
One of the most striking ideas in the interview is that the old boundaries between:
- the Middle East
- North and East Africa
- South Asia / “AfPak”
- and even the Ukraine war
are beginning to blur. Montefiore suggests future conflicts will not be neatly contained by region, and that actors from Russia, Ukraine, India, Pakistan, Israel, and others may increasingly appear across overlapping theaters.
The region needs a new map — and perhaps a new name
Because pipelines, ports, alliances, and military presences are being redrawn, Montefiore argues the Middle East is entering a phase where the old state system is under strain. In his view, the region’s complexity is not temporary; it is structural.
Key takeaways
- The Middle East’s instability is historical, not accidental.
- Empires, not just local actors, shaped the modern region—but local governments have now carried responsibility for decades.
- Turkey, Israel, and Iran are the main military powers today, even though none is fully secure internally.
- Nasserism failed because charisma and ideology could not overcome strategic mistakes and state decay.
- Israel’s future depends on whether it can preserve institutions, social cohesion, and international support.
- Iran may gain influence, especially if U.S. reliability continues to decline.
- The region is moving toward a more interconnected geopolitical system, where crises in one area spill quickly into others.
Memorable lines and ideas
- The Middle East is a “cauldron” because it is a crossroads of identities and rivalries.
- “You can’t build a state permanently on war.”
- The post-Ottoman order is still being worked out more than a century later.
- The old regional boundaries are breaking down; the next era may require a completely new strategic map.