Overview of Rachman Review — Is it possible to negotiate with Iran?
Gideon Rachman interviews Baroness Catherine Ashton (EU High Representative for Foreign Policy, 2009–2014) about the diplomatic fallout from the Iran war: the widening US–Europe rift, Europe's reluctance to join US-led military action, the prospects for renewed negotiations with Iran, and what successful diplomacy would require. Ashton draws on her experience leading the EU role in the Iran nuclear negotiations to explain why talks are still possible but will be difficult, and she outlines practical formats and trust-building steps that could make a negotiated end to the conflict feasible.
Key takeaways
- The US–European rift is serious but reversible. Much depends on how the conflict develops and on the volatile rhetoric of the current US administration.
- Europe’s reluctance to join US military action stems from unclear objectives, legal and parliamentary constraints, and public skepticism about the purpose and legality of intervention.
- NATO and the “special relationship” with the US are under strain; Europe needs to accelerate efforts on its own defence capabilities and a stronger European pillar within NATO.
- Negotiation with Iran remains necessary and possible: all conflicts end at a table. But trust is low because the Iranians have experienced negotiated agreements being abandoned (e.g., US withdrawal from the JCPOA).
- Effective negotiations should start small, involve trusted intermediaries and regional actors (Oman, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt), and may require new, non-traditional formats rather than a repeat of the old P5+1 model.
- Iran has signalled priorities that can form the basis of talks (most notably reopening the Strait of Hormuz, reparations/reconstruction and guarantees against renewed attacks), but gaps between demands and what others will accept are large.
- Economic consequences (energy prices) make a prolonged conflict politically costly for many states and could push some countries toward seeking quick diplomatic fixes.
Topics discussed
- US–Europe political rupture: reasons, rhetoric, and prospects for reconciliation
- Trump-era behaviour (tariffs, threats) as a contributor to European scepticism
- The role of NATO bases and questioning of the alliance’s utility
- European unity and decision-making
- Surprise and confusion in capitals about US aims
- Legal and parliamentary constraints on deploying forces
- Renewed UK–EU security conversations post-Brexit; opportunities and diplomatic challenges
- Iran negotiations and formats
- Ashton’s experience leading EU involvement in the JCPOA-era talks
- Why negotiation is still necessary (Strait of Hormuz, regional security, Gaza/Israel implications)
- Potential new convenors (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Oman) and the value of regional groupings
- Practical bargaining chips and obstacles
- Iran’s use of the Straits of Hormuz as leverage ("they've played their ace card")
- Iranian demand for guarantees and reparations versus what others will accept
- Credibility problem after prior deal was unpicked by a US administration
- Risk of escalation and domestic political impacts
- Rising fuel prices and public opinion implications (including US midterms)
- Danger of misread signals and rhetoric causing unintended escalation
Notable quotes and insights
- “Any conflict, people have to end it around a table. It's a simple fact.” — on the inevitability of negotiation to end wars.
- “They've played their ace card… the Strait of Hormuz.” — on Iran’s strategic leverage.
- “One of the first rules of diplomacy is know what the people opposite you are looking at.” — on the importance of understanding the counterpart’s perceptions.
- Practical observation: even in highly fraught moments (e.g., Russia/Ukraine developments during JCPOA talks), countries can keep negotiating if they commit to the process.
Practical implications / recommendations (from Ashton’s experience)
- Start small: begin with limited, confidence-building measures that involve trusted intermediaries and regional actors before moving to comprehensive agreements.
- Use regional conveners: countries Iran trusts (Oman, Turkey) and influential regional states (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt) can form an effective negotiating platform.
- Address credibility: any deal requires credible, enforceable guarantees so Iran trusts that agreements won’t be unilaterally voided later.
- Broaden the scope beyond nuclear issues: include shipping rights (Strait of Hormuz), reconstruction, security guarantees, and regional political arrangements to build a durable settlement.
- Europe should pursue both: (a) greater defence/strategic autonomy to reduce overreliance on a volatile US policy; and (b) an urgent, well-resourced diplomatic effort (especially by the UK) to rebuild relationships with EU partners.
- Manage public and parliamentary expectations: states must clarify objectives and legal bases before committing to military action.
Risk assessment
- High risk of further escalation if military action continues; misread signals and rhetoric can provoke retaliation cycles.
- Political and economic pressure (energy costs) increase incentives for a negotiated settlement, but also raise the bar for quick compromises.
- Trust deficit — especially caused by prior US withdrawal from JCPOA — is the principal barrier to rapid, credible negotiations.
Bottom line
Ashton is clear-eyed but not pessimistic: diplomacy remains the only sustainable way to end the conflict. It will require realistic, stepwise negotiations led or brokered by trusted regional and international actors, credible guarantees to overcome past breaches of trust, and coordinated political will—especially from Europe, which must both push for de‑escalation and strengthen its own strategic autonomy.