Overview of Rachman Review — "Iran war: What does Tehran want and will it get it?"
This episode of the Financial Times' Rachman Review (host Gideon Rachman) features Suzanne Maloney (Brookings Institution) discussing the state of the conflict between the US, Iran and Israel, what Tehran's goals are, and how likely negotiated settlement looks. The conversation covers Iran's strategic aims and resilience, the central negotiating dossiers (nuclear program, control of the Strait of Hormuz, proxies and reparations), internal Iranian leadership shifts, regional implications (Gulf neighbours, Israel), and the prospects and constraints for diplomacy.
Key takeaways
- Iran has treated the conflict as existential and followed a deliberate strategy aimed at regime survival and emerging stronger, notably by leveraging control over the Strait of Hormuz.
- The war created leverage for Tehran: time favors Iran because the international economic pain from disrupted Gulf flows mounts quickly while Iran can endure longer.
- Core negotiation gaps are large but not necessarily insurmountable — nuclear constraints, the status of enriched uranium, and the reopening/management of the Strait of Hormuz are the hardest issues.
- Any settlement will be messy and protracted; a battlefield decisive victory is unlikely. Diplomacy is the only realistic exit but will include intermittent fighting and a long bargaining process.
- Regional actors (Gulf states, Israel, China) will shape outcomes: Gulf states want stability yet may need to help fund reconstruction or accept compromises; Israel will resist Iranian strengthening; China may push for a quicker settlement for economic reasons.
What Tehran wants (as explained by Suzanne Maloney)
- Regime survival above all; to emerge from the conflict intact and with deterrence against future US/Israeli actions.
- Retain a functioning nuclear enrichment capability (not willing to give it up permanently), and control over nuclear materials built up since 2018.
- Reopen the Strait of Hormuz on favourable terms — ideally some legal/financial mechanism that preserves Iran’s leverage (tolls or fees have been floated).
- Sanctions relief and access to frozen assets to finance reconstruction and reduce domestic economic pressure.
- Limits on external demands that would dismantle Tehran’s regional posture (e.g., ending all proxy support and ballistic missile capabilities are hard asks for Iran to accept).
Main negotiating dossiers
- Nuclear program: US wants cessation/restrictions; Iran refuses permanent surrender of enrichment. Critical unresolved items include accounting for advanced centrifuges and caches of highly enriched uranium.
- Strait of Hormuz: Iranian closure/tolling has given Tehran leverage. The US and global community view tolling as unacceptable; possible compromise ideas include small transit fees tied to reconstruction funds, but no precedent and significant resistance from Gulf states and the US.
- Proxies and missiles: The US/Israel seek curbs on Iran’s support for militias and its ballistic missile program — difficult to extract at the negotiating table.
- Reparations and sanctions: Iran seeks compensation and sanctions relief; the US and Israel oppose formal reparations, but reconstruction/toll revenues or targeted relief could act as proxies.
Iran’s strategy and why it has been effective
- Tehran prepared a detailed plan and targeted responses early (soft targets, then economic/energy infrastructure), exploiting asymmetric tactics and ingenuity (parallels drawn with lessons from Ukraine).
- Control or effective disruption of maritime chokepoints (especially Hormuz) has amplified Iran’s bargaining power by quickly raising global economic costs.
- Iran has conserved resources and used measured, targeted retaliation rather than all-out escalation, preserving endurance.
Internal Iranian politics and leadership
- Significant churn at the top after the assassination of the Supreme Leader (as described in the interview). Mojtaba Khamenei is named successor but has been a largely unseen public figure; the security-military apparatus now more front-and-center.
- Negotiating delegations have included senior security figures and economic actors tied to the Revolutionary Guard, indicating military-economic elites hold strong influence.
- The regime remains unpopular domestically; pre-war protests and COVID-driven economic stress persist — reconstruction and sanctions relief will be critical to domestic stability.
The Israeli and Gulf perspectives
- Israel: Will resist any outcome that leaves Iran strategically stronger; willing to take actions more risk-tolerant than the US if it deems necessary. US logistical support has influenced Israeli operations; Washington can constrain Israeli actions indirectly through support decisions.
- Gulf states: Suffer immediate economic and security fallout. While rhetorically opposed to a strengthened Iran, Gulf states may become pragmatically involved in reconstruction or targeted sanctions relief because regional stability and trade restoration are in their interest.
- China: Likely to pressure Tehran to negotiate — Beijing wants open shipping lanes and economic continuity and could play a significant diplomatic role.
Prospects for negotiation and timeline
- Diplomacy is the only realistic way to end the conflict; neither side can secure a decisive battlefield victory.
- Negotiations will be long, winding, and episodic — with likely bursts of fighting between diplomatic rounds.
- Time is a double-edged sword: Iran can leverage delay, but there is also a limit to how far Iran can push without provoking broader regional or international escalations.
- External political calendars (e.g., US domestic politics, presidential trips) add impetus for quicker deals but do not guarantee one.
Notable quotes and insights
- “The Iranians had a plan… they were prepared for this.” — Suzanne Maloney, on Tehran’s preparedness and strategy.
- Time favors Iran because global economic pain accumulates faster than Iran’s domestic capacity to absorb it, giving Tehran leverage in negotiations.
- Any realistic settlement will likely involve creative, atypical compromises (e.g., transit fees, targeted investment) rather than clean, legally permanent reversals.
Risks, uncertainties and counterarguments
- Counterargument: Iran’s economy is fragile; a sustained blockade and sanctions could still cause domestic collapse. Maloney acknowledges this risk but believes Iran can leverage asymmetric options (e.g., proxy actions, targeting infrastructure) to prolong leverage.
- Uncertainties include the full accounting of Iran’s nuclear materials, the public role of Mojtaba Khamenei, the willingness of the US administration to make politically costly concessions, and the coordination among US, Israeli and Gulf policy choices.
What to watch next (actionable indicators)
- Whether talks resume and the composition/mandate of negotiating teams (security-heavy Iranian delegations signal priorities).
- Developments in the Strait of Hormuz: any partial reopening plans, proposed transit fee formulas, or renewed attacks on shipping/infrastructure.
- Information on Iran’s nuclear stockpile and international access for verification (IAEA involvement or lack thereof).
- US decisions on munitions/logistical support to Israel — shifts signal how far Washington will pressure or enable Israeli actions.
- Gulf states’ posture on reconstruction financing or accepting Iran access to assets — signs of pragmatic accommodation.
- China’s diplomatic engagement and statements pushing for a settlement.
Short recommendations for policymakers and observers
- Diplomacy should prioritize phased, verifiable nuclear constraints and a practical, time-limited mechanism for Hormuz transit that minimizes precedent for tolling while enabling commercial flows.
- Prepare contingency plans for economic fallout in global markets (energy, shipping) and fast-track multilateral mitigation measures.
- Encourage multilateral verification and phased sanctions relief tied to verifiable Iranian concessions — include Gulf partners in reconstruction planning to reduce incentives for renewed Iranian coercion.
End of summary.