Overview of Britain’s post-Brexit policy options
In this Financial Times Rachman Review episode, Gideon Rachman speaks with Ben Judah about the strategic choices facing Britain in a more volatile world. The conversation centers on how the UK should navigate three interlocking relationships — with China, the United States, and Europe — as Labour seeks a coherent post-Brexit foreign policy. The core argument is that Britain can no longer treat these as separate files: decisions on China shape ties with Washington and Brussels, while pressure from an increasingly erratic US and an assertive China is pushing Britain closer to Europe.
The central dilemma: threat or opportunity?
Ben Judah frames Britain’s choices as a series of trade-offs rather than simple yes/no decisions:
- China can be treated either as:
- a strategic and geoeconomic threat that undermines Western industry and supports authoritarian powers, or
- an economic opportunity through cheaper goods, investment, and price relief for consumers.
- The US is no longer a stable assumption:
- Britain must decide whether America has become permanently coercive and unreliable.
- Europe is increasingly relevant again:
- Britain may need deeper alignment with European partners to offset both Chinese pressure and American unpredictability.
China: security threat, economic lure, or both?
Judah argues Britain has not fully made up its mind on China and is effectively trying to do both at once.
Key points on China
- China is seen as part of a broader authoritarian axis with Russia, North Korea, and Iran.
- Beijing’s industrial overcapacity and dumping are described as a serious threat to European manufacturing.
- At the same time, the UK government sees value in:
- cheaper consumer goods,
- a warmer diplomatic relationship,
- and selective cooperation, such as on climate.
Judah’s recommendation
He argues Britain should work more closely with allies — especially the EU, US, Canada, and Japan — to defend manufacturing and avoid long-term dependency on Chinese supply chains and strategic industries.
Policy critique
Judah says current UK structures are outdated:
- security and economic policy are still handled separately,
- but China requires a combined national economic and security approach.
The United States: from special relationship to “specialist relationship”
The episode makes a sharp distinction between the mythology of the “special relationship” and the reality of British dependence.
Main argument
- Britain does not receive broad political favoritism from the US.
- What it really has is a specialist relationship in narrow areas:
- intelligence,
- military cooperation,
- nuclear systems.
Why the US is a growing problem
Judah says Trump-era and post-Trump Republican politics have changed the nature of alliance politics:
- Democrats see allies as force multipliers.
- Republicans increasingly see allies as burdens to be coerced.
- Trump is described as practicing foreign politics, not foreign policy — intervening in the domestic politics of allies and amplifying populist movements.
What Britain should do
Rather than trying to “break” with Washington, Judah argues Britain should:
- invest in greater autonomy in certain areas,
- especially where the US may not be dependable, such as the European security theater.
Building autonomy without breaking the alliance
Judah is skeptical of a full British decoupling from the US, but thinks selective autonomy is both possible and necessary.
Most realistic priorities
- Develop independent satellite reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities with European partners.
- Build capacity for a scenario where the US may not fully back Europe in a crisis, especially involving Russia and NATO’s eastern flank.
- Maintain cooperation with the US where it is unavoidable or strategically sensible:
- China confrontation,
- Middle East operations,
- nuclear and intelligence collaboration.
On nuclear independence
Judah says a fully autonomous UK nuclear deterrent would be extremely expensive — potentially around 5% of GDP — and is not realistic. A more plausible path would be:
- expanded UK-French cooperation,
- possibly on air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons,
- as a deterrent for European contingencies where the US might hesitate.
Europe: why Brexit’s logic is eroding
A major theme is that the world that justified Brexit has changed.
Why Europe is back in focus
Labour’s time in government, Judah says, has made the economic costs of Brexit more visible:
- weak growth,
- limited policy room,
- need for faster economic gains.
He argues that deeper EU alignment — potentially through the customs union or single market rather than full rejoining — could recover some of the lost GDP from Brexit.
Political logic
A more pro-Europe stance could also help Labour politically by:
- consolidating progressive voters,
- appealing to younger voters,
- regaining some Green and Lib Dem support,
- creating a stronger pro-European bloc.
Obstacles
The biggest hurdles would be:
- French hard bargaining,
- public backlash if the terms look humiliating,
- lack of serious leader-level diplomacy in advance.
Rejoining the EU: what would need to happen?
Judah says any serious move toward closer EU ties would require substantial political groundwork.
What’s missing now
- Europe policy is still handled too technocratically.
- There is no strong political advisor in No. 10 focused on rebuilding European relationships the way earlier governments had.
What would be needed
- direct, high-level political outreach to:
- Emmanuel Macron,
- Friedrich Merz,
- Brussels institutions.
- careful preparation of the public for what a closer relationship would mean.
On common objections
Judah argues some barriers are manageable:
- Euro membership could be exempted or delayed for any new arrangement.
- Schengen may be less of a problem than it appears because of:
- the Good Friday Agreement,
- Ireland’s position,
- and the fact that Schengen participation is not automatic.
Government machinery is outdated
One of the sharper institutional critiques in the discussion is that Britain’s foreign policy system is too old-fashioned for today’s challenges.
Judah’s proposed fix
Replace the current setup with:
- a National Economic and Security Secretariat,
- and a National Economic and Security Council.
This would better integrate:
- security,
- trade,
- industrial policy,
- energy,
- and diplomacy.
Judah’s personal shift: from Atlanticist to more Euro-focused
He describes his own evolution:
- Initially a convinced Atlanticist.
- After experience in government and direct exposure to Trump-era politics, he became more supportive of European strategic distance from the US.
What changed his mind
- American erraticism on:
- Ukraine,
- China,
- Iran.
- A deeper sense that US politics had become volatile and personalistic.
- The idea that allies are now often viewed in Washington as objects of pressure rather than partners.
Political implications for Labour and Britain
The episode closes by looking ahead to the domestic consequences of these foreign-policy choices.
Key political takeaways
- Foreign policy will consume a huge share of any future prime minister’s attention.
- Britain needs better preparation for diplomatic “bear traps,” including:
- NATO summits,
- Commonwealth summits,
- the G20 in the UK.
- These events will test any government’s ability to manage:
- Trump,
- China,
- reparations debates,
- and international optics.
Broader conclusion
Judah’s overall message is that Britain’s post-Brexit foreign policy has reached a turning point:
- China forces a choice between cheap goods and strategic resilience.
- The US can no longer be assumed to provide reliable leadership.
- Europe is becoming the most practical path to economic and strategic strength.
Bottom line
The episode argues that Britain must stop treating China, the US, and Europe as separate policy questions. In a more dangerous and fragmented world, the UK needs:
- clearer priorities on China,
- more autonomy from US unpredictability,
- and a serious political reset with Europe.
The underlying thesis is simple: Brexit’s assumptions no longer fit today’s geopolitics, and Britain must adapt or drift into strategic weakness.