Overview of The Rachman Review: How Middle Powers Can Work Together After the US
Financial Times foreign affairs commentator Gideon Rachman speaks with Sir Robin Niblett, author of After America, about whether countries such as Britain, Canada, Japan and Brazil can cooperate to protect their interests as US and Chinese power becomes less predictable. Niblett argues that middle powers need one another to shape their futures, but that cooperation will be uneven, shaped by each country’s leverage and security ties.
Why Middle Powers Are Coordinating
Niblett defines a middle power as a country that cannot reliably influence its external environment on its own. With the World Trade Organization struggling to sustain trade cooperation, countries are finding workarounds: cooperating on trade rules, digital services, defense technology and security.
Examples include the UK, Italy and Japan’s fighter-jet program; European missile-defense cooperation; and Japan’s expanding security ties with partners in the Indo-Pacific. These efforts are often informal and loosely connected, but they can give countries more room to act.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney captured the urgency in Davos: “If we’re not at the table, we’re on the menu.”
Cooperation Depends on Leverage and Trust
Middle powers do not automatically have influence just because they are mid-sized. Canada, for example, sends about three-quarters of its exports to the US, making it highly exposed to American pressure. Carney’s outreach to other partners has coincided with moves to ease tensions with Washington, such as withdrawing Canada’s digital services tax proposal. Niblett contrasts this with European countries, which have retained more room to push back on US demands.
Relations between potential partners can also be difficult. Japan and South Korea have serious historical tensions, while Britain and France have different approaches to sovereignty and Europe. Still, Niblett says shared security and economic interests can motivate cooperation, as seen in recent Japan–South Korea engagement and British-French defense work.
Shared Rules, Different Levels of Partnership
Niblett argues that democracies and autocracies alike benefit from trade and investment rules that are not dictated by the strongest country. They also share an interest in the principle that borders should not be changed by force.
Security cooperation is narrower. Countries with close intelligence and defense ties to the US may be able to coordinate deeply while keeping the door open to Washington; other partners may cooperate mainly on economic issues. The G7 provides one possible forum for this closer group: its members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US, with the EU participating. Niblett describes the non-US members as trying to maintain cooperation even when American participation is uncertain.
The EU’s Role and the AI Challenge
Niblett sees the EU as a civilian power with substantial trade influence but limited ability to act as a unified geopolitical force. National governments often defend their own prerogatives, yet EU rules and market size can give member countries extra negotiating leverage.
In AI, the US and China lead across the full technology stack, from energy and semiconductors to models and deployment. Other powers may have leverage through access to their markets. Niblett suggests they can use that leverage to attract computing and semiconductor investment, then apply AI across industries such as manufacturing.
What “After America” Means
Niblett’s argument is that the US-led order is ending, not simply that it is temporarily disrupted by one administration. He points to economic vulnerabilities exposed by dependence on overseas supplies, pressure to bring more production home, and the prospect that US debt and domestic politics will limit its ability to sustain a global security role.
He expects the US to remain important and believes NATO and Asian alliances may survive, but says they will be less dependable unless partners invest more in their own defense. In Europe especially, middle powers will need stronger conventional capabilities to make existing security guarantees credible.