What Biden Officials Wish They Had Done Differently in Gaza

Summary of What Biden Officials Wish They Had Done Differently in Gaza

by The New Yorker

38mJuly 22, 2026

Overview of The Political Scene from The New Yorker

This episode examines David Kirkpatrick’s reporting on how the Biden administration handled Israel’s war in Gaza, focusing on former senior officials’ private regrets, internal debates, and the limits of U.S. leverage over Prime Minister Netanyahu. The conversation argues that the White House often tried to pressure Israel behind the scenes while avoiding public confrontation, and that this “no daylight” approach may have functioned as permission for a war that caused massive civilian suffering. It also explores how fears of a wider regional war with Iran shaped the administration’s decisions.

Key Points

The Red Cross letter as an early warning

  • The episode opens with an unpublished letter from the International Committee of the Red Cross to President Biden.
  • Kirkpatrick says the letter mattered because the ICRC has a special role under the Geneva Conventions in helping prevent war-crimes violations.
  • The letter, based on public reporting available by March 2024, suggested Israel was at best pushing the limits of the laws of armed conflict.
  • A major point of concern was Israel’s refusal to allow the ICRC access to Palestinian detainees, which the guest describes as a clear and troubling disregard for the Geneva Conventions.

The Biden administration’s approach to Israel

  • Privately, Biden and top officials such as Antony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, and Brett McGurk did try to influence Israel’s war conduct.
  • Publicly, however, they avoided visible distance from Israel, which Kirkpatrick says created the impression of tacit approval.
  • Officials repeatedly assumed a ceasefire-hostage deal was imminent, which made them reluctant to apply stronger pressure.
  • In hindsight, Kirkpatrick says that expectation caused the administration to “pull its punches” for months.

Biden’s worldview and political instincts

  • Biden campaigned on not conditioning military aid to Israel and saw himself as deeply pro-Israel.
  • His instincts were shaped by past experience, especially his belief that public pressure from the Obama era had been ineffective.
  • He favored quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy and believed that approach worked better in the 2021 Israel-Hamas conflict.
  • In this episode, Kirkpatrick says Biden was a dominant force in policymaking, not a passive or detached president.

The missed “tough love” speech

  • Officials discussed a speech in which Biden would speak directly to the Israeli public and warn against a maximalist war strategy.
  • The idea was to present two paths:
    • continued all-out war with mounting international isolation and long-term insecurity
    • a narrower campaign that better protected civilians and preserved a path toward a two-state solution
  • The speech was never delivered.
  • A later draft became more of a “take the deal” speech when a ceasefire proposal was being floated.

Iran and the risk of regional war

  • A major reason the administration was cautious was fear that Gaza could spiral into a broader Israel-Iran war.
  • Kirkpatrick says Netanyahu repeatedly took provocative actions toward Iran, while the U.S. felt compelled to defend Israel each time.
  • Some former officials now see this as a “moral hazard”: Israel could escalate, and the U.S. would bear the cost.
  • The conversation suggests that by 2024 Israel’s strikes had weakened Iran’s defenses, setting up future escalation.

What officials now say they accomplished

  • Former Biden officials are said to take pride in having prevented a full regional war during Biden’s tenure.
  • They also believe U.S. pressure slowed the pace of civilian deaths, especially later in the war.
  • They point to Biden’s intervention around Rafah as an example of where American pressure may have reduced the scale of destruction.

Main Takeaways

The central regret

  • The biggest regret among some officials is not a single bad decision, but a pattern:
    • assuming a ceasefire was always around the corner
    • avoiding public confrontation
    • trusting Netanyahu’s promises longer than they should have

A tension between law, politics, and war management

  • Kirkpatrick highlights a divide between:
    • those focused on humanitarian law and U.S. legal obligations
    • those inside the administration focused on preventing a wider war and hostage deaths
  • The episode suggests that this tension led to repeated delays in decisive action.

Biden’s personal role was decisive

  • The interview pushes back on the idea that Biden was not in control.
  • On Gaza, Kirkpatrick describes him as highly engaged, opinionated, and sometimes dismissive of his own senior staff.
  • His long-standing instincts toward Israel heavily shaped policy.

Notable Insights

  • “No daylight” with Israel may have been intended as diplomacy, but in practice it often looked like acquiescence.
  • Officials believed that acting too forcefully could prolong the war, worsen hostage outcomes, or trigger a regional conflict.
  • Kirkpatrick suggests that the administration’s private concern for Gaza did not translate into enough public or material pressure to alter Israel’s conduct meaningfully.
  • Biden himself reportedly showed anguish in public remarks, but declined to be interviewed for the piece.

Bottom Line

The episode portrays the Biden administration’s Gaza policy as a case of constrained power, delayed pressure, and repeated misjudgment about when a ceasefire might happen. Former officials defend their choices as the best possible under the circumstances, but many also acknowledge that they should have acted sooner and more forcefully—especially once the scale of civilian suffering and legal concern became undeniable.