Overview of How to Protect the 2026 Elections from Donald Trump
This episode of The Political Scene (The New Yorker), hosted by Susan Glasser with Evan Osnos and Jane Mayer, features UCLA law and political science professor Rick Hasen (director of the Safeguarding Democracy Project). The conversation diagnoses current efforts by Donald Trump and allies to delegitimize and potentially interfere with U.S. elections ahead of 2026, distinguishes realistic legal limits from alarming rhetoric, and lays out practical steps—legal, institutional, and civic—that can help protect the integrity of future elections.
Core takeaways
- Legal limits: The Constitution gives states primary authority to run elections; the president does not have unilateral power to "nationalize" state-run elections or seize ballots. Congressional action could standardize some rules, but a presidential executive order cannot lawfully nationalize elections.
- Threat vector to watch: Rather than large-scale vote-switching (which is practically and institutionally unlikely), the main risk is creating a pretext of fraud to interfere with ballot tabulation after Election Day (e.g., attempts to seize ballots or stop counting in key jurisdictions).
- Pattern of tactics: Requests for voter-roll data, DOJ inquiries, public claims of widespread fraud, and pressure campaigns are likely intended to generate a pretext for legal or extralegal interference (e.g., documentary-proof registration rules, forensic claims, or court-ordered seizures).
- Bulwarks: Courts, decentralized state/local election administrators, and civic mobilization are the three primary defenses. Advance legal planning (injunctions), robust local election infrastructure, and public readiness to protest are critical.
- Practical optimism: Large-scale, secret election fraud is extremely unlikely due to professionalization and decentralization of election administration; however, targeted disruption after votes are cast is a realistic danger that merits preparation.
Topics discussed
- Recent troubling signals: Trump statements about "nationalizing" elections in 15 states, regretting not seizing voting machines in 2020, DOJ activity (raid on Fulton County), and broad requests for state voter-roll data (46 states + D.C.).
- Role and limits of presidential power: Constitutional allocation of election authority to states; Article I, Section 4 (Congressional power to regulate aspects of congressional elections); court rulings rejecting executive overreach in this space.
- Historical context: Decline of large-scale election fraud since the 1970s due to professionalization; isolated local fraud still possible but unlikely to flip major contests.
- Post-election risks: Stopping counts, seizing ballots, litigating seating of members in a narrowly divided House, and using claims of fraud to delegitimize outcomes—especially problematic if control of Congress hinges on close results.
- Pretexts and policy aims: Pushes for voter-roll data could be used to justify documentary-proof-of-citizenship registration efforts (referenced by the SAVE Act and past Chris Kobach-style policies) that disproportionately disenfranchise certain voters.
- Institutional responses: Role of states seeking pre-election court injunctions against federal interference; resource needs for local election offices; importance of poll workers and observers.
Notable quotes and insights
- Rick Hasen: "The right emotion is one of vigilance and not fear." (Emphasizes preparation over panic.)
- Rick Hasen: "What concerns me most is a pretext of fraud to potentially seize ballots as they're being tabulated." (Identifies the most realistic danger.)
- Susan Glasser (panel quip): "Never trust a man with a $500 million yacht to own a national treasure [media organization]." (Contextual remark about billionaire influence on institutions.)
- On decentralization: While decentralization has weaknesses, it is also a strength—harder for an authoritarian to seize control of many local systems.
Concrete action items and recommendations
Legal/institutional
- States and local election officials should seek pre‑election federal injunctions that bar the federal government (including DOJ) from interfering with ballot tabulation and chain-of-custody after votes are cast.
- Legislatures and election administrators should work to speed accurate ballot processing (pre‑processing, adequate staffing, funding) so fewer contests remain uncertain after Election Day.
- Monitor and litigate attempts to obtain voter-roll data or to impose documentary proof-of-citizenship registration rules.
Community and civic
- Recruit and train poll workers and bipartisan/nonpartisan election observers to ensure transparent processes on and after Election Day.
- Pressure state and local officials and legislatures to fund and prepare election administration (counting resources, secure chains of custody).
- Vote early (mail or in-person where possible) to reduce Election Day bottlenecks and uncertainty.
- Be prepared for peaceful civic mobilization if federal agents attempt to physically seize ballots or otherwise disrupt local tabulation.
Legal readiness and public awareness
- Support organizations and lawyers working on pre‑emptive litigation and election-protection strategies.
- Follow credible reporting and expert analysis (e.g., law professors, election-administration groups) rather than unverified claims of fraud.
- Push for transparency in DOJ requests and state responses (who asked for voter rolls, how the data will be used).
What to watch next (red flags)
- Continued or expanded DOJ requests for state voter rolls or proprietary election data; whether states refuse or provide data.
- Any court filings or emergency orders seeking authority to seize ballots or otherwise intervene in tabulation.
- Further raids, law-enforcement activity, or federal agents appearing at local election facilities (e.g., Fulton County-type events).
- Public statements by influential Republicans (e.g., House leadership) normalizing "nationalizing" election rhetoric or refusing to condemn interference.
- New legislative pushes for documentary proof-of-citizenship registration rules or similar measures that would purge or block eligible voters.
Bottom line
Large-scale covert manipulation of votes remains unlikely because of decentralized, professional election systems. The credible danger is strategic use of claims of fraud, legal pretexts, and targeted interventions after voting to disrupt counting or to delegitimize results—particularly in very close House or other races. Preparation—legal injunctions, resourcing and protecting local election operations, civic engagement (poll workers and observers), and public readiness to defend ballot integrity—can blunt these threats. The episode counsels vigilance, legal planning, and civic muscle rather than panic.