Summary of Why Iran Believes It Has the Upper Hand

Overview of Why Iran Believes It Has the Upper Hand

This episode (New York Times Opinion) is a deep interview with Suzanne Maloney (Brookings Institution), who explains why Iran—despite heavy strikes and reported leadership losses—appears to believe it holds the strategic advantage in the current U.S.–Iran war. The conversation contrasts President Trump’s shifting public rhetoric (threats of “obliteration,” short timelines for victory, or abandoning the Strait of Hormuz) with what experts see on the ground: an Iran that has learned to weaponize the Strait, absorb severe damage, and wait out external pressure while imposing global economic costs.

Key takeaways

• Iran currently believes it has the upper hand because it can disrupt the Strait of Hormuz and therefore global energy and commodity flows, giving it time and leverage.
• U.S. public messaging under President Trump has been inconsistent; rhetoric often doesn’t match on-the-ground options or consequences.
• Militarily replacing Iran’s regime or permanently securing the Strait would require a far larger and longer commitment than the U.S. appears willing to make.
• Unilateral U.S. strikes have not eliminated Iran’s ability to threaten the region—missile, drone, and rebuilding capabilities remain.
• A short-term U.S. withdrawal that leaves Iran controlling the strait would be strategically costly: economic shock, weakened alliances, and emboldened Tehran.
• Diplomatic and coalition options (escorts, international mediation) are presented as the most realistic path to end the crisis quickly and limit damage.

Topics covered

• Assessment of current war status: mixed U.S. messaging vs. battlefield realities
• The U.S. 15‑point peace plan vs. Iran’s counterproposal (compensation, control/monetization of the Strait)
• Strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz and how its partial/complete closure affects global markets
• Why Iran can “afford to wait” despite military losses
• Feasibility and risks of U.S. military options (Karg/Kish Island, occupation, resupply vulnerabilities)
• Iranian regime resilience and institutional strength in the face of leadership losses
• Israel’s aims and “mowing the lawn” strategy; widening conflict with Hezbollah and Lebanon
• Global implications: allies, energy markets, potential Chinese/Pakistani diplomatic roles
• Longer-term risks: nuclear capability, asymmetric retaliation, erosion of American leadership

Why Iran thinks it’s winning

• Control/leverage over the Strait of Hormuz: tanker traffic dropped dramatically (from ~130–140 daily to only a handful), causing rapid regional price and supply pressure.
• Time advantage: ongoing disruption compounds global shortages over weeks; markets and political pressure on the U.S. mount with time.
• Resilience: despite targeted strikes and reported elimination of leaders, Iran’s institutions and military (IRGC, missile/drone capabilities, technical expertise) persist and can reconstitute programs.
• Strategic aims: Iran wants to emerge with financial gains (monetizing passage), compensation, and a deterrent that ensures the U.S. and Israel are dissuaded from future strikes.

U.S. policy, messaging, and military options

• Trump’s rhetoric is volatile: alternating claims of imminent victory, impending escalation, and willingness to “leave” the problem for allies.
• The 15‑point U.S. plan seeks long-term curbs (no enrichment, end to proxy support, ballistic missile limits); Iran has refused direct talks under current conditions.
• Military options (e.g., seizing Karg/Kish islands, occupying coastline) are technically possible but:
  • Require many more troops and sustained commitment.
  • Expose forces to high casualty and resupply risks.
  • Would likely be temporary if the regime remains intact.
• Limited measures exist (naval escorts, multinational convoys) that could mitigate the strait closure without full-scale occupation.
• Maloney argues diplomacy—backed by international pressure and coalition action—is the most viable, least costly path to end the crisis quickly.

Risks and likely outcomes

• Short-term: sharp rises in oil, fertilizer, and key commodity prices; supply-chain shocks for electronics (e.g., helium shortages); political pressure on the U.S. and partners.
• Medium/long-term (if the U.S. withdraws without resolving strait control):
  • Iran consolidates gains, monetizes passage, and rebuilds deterrent capabilities.
  • U.S. credibility and alliances weaken; partners may be forced to shoulder security or seek alternatives (China, Russia).
  • Israel likely to continue strikes independently, prolonging instability and raising regional escalation risks.
• Worst-case strategic outcome: a battered but emboldened Iran that concludes negotiations with the U.S. cannot be trusted and therefore prioritizes deterrence (including possibly a faster nuclear breakout pathway).

The Israel–Lebanon/Hezbollah front

• Fighting has expanded into Lebanon with large Israeli incursions; Maloney warns of:
  • Heavy casualties and occupation risks.
  • Long-term destabilization that could strengthen Hezbollah and weaken Lebanon’s central government.
  • Negative spillovers for regional diplomacy (Abraham Accords relationships) and U.S. ability to disentangle itself.

What Iran is likely learning and how it may adapt

• Time and asymmetric tactics matter: closing or threatening the strait is an effective lever to influence global behavior.
• Iran has historical experience sustaining long, costly conflicts (e.g., Iran–Iraq war) and can apply similar improvisation and resilience.
• The regime will prioritize rebuilding missile/drone capabilities, dispersing infrastructure, and investing in means to inflict economic/political pain on adversaries.
• A lesson Iran may take: negotiations with the U.S. are unreliable unless backed by enforceable, multilateral guarantees—so deterrence becomes central.

Practical implications and policy suggestions (implied by the interview)

• Immediate: monitor strait closures, shipping insurance/disruption indicators, and commodity futures; coordinate urgent diplomacy with allies (Europe, Gulf states, India, China).
• Medium-term: build a multilateral escort/protection mechanism to reopen necessary shipping lanes without unilateral occupation.
• Avoid simplistic “decapitation” expectations—plan realistically for prolonged engagement if military options are pursued.
• Prepare contingency plans for economic disruptions (energy subsidies, strategic reserves, fertilizer alternatives).
• Rebuild and prioritize alliances: deter unilateral shifting of burden to partners or wholesale withdrawal that invites strategic revision by China or Russia.

Notable quotes

• Suzanne Maloney: “Iran thinks it’s winning this war.”
• Trump (as quoted in the episode): “We’re going to bring them back to the Stone Ages.”
• Maloney’s metaphor for Iran’s strategic goal: turning the Strait of Hormuz into a “toll booth.”

Recommended further reading (books Suzanne Maloney suggested)

• The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty‑Year Conflict with Iran — David Crist
• American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis — edited by Warren Christopher
• Democracy in Iran: Why It Failed and How It Might Succeed — Misagh Parsa

Bottom line

Maloney argues the present conflict has given Iran unexpected leverage: economic pressure via the Strait of Hormuz, institutional resilience despite leadership targeting, and time to force a costly political choice on the U.S. and its partners. The interview warns that without a credible, multilateral diplomatic solution—and absent a politically and economically costly occupation—the most likely outcome is a weakened but emboldened Iran that has learned to make coercive use of its geographic and asymmetric advantages.