War in Iran is Chewing Through American Missile Stockpiles

Summary of War in Iran is Chewing Through American Missile Stockpiles

by Bloomberg

44m•March 16, 2026
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Overview of War in Iran is Chewing Through American Missile Stockpiles (Odd Lots — Bloomberg)

This Odd Lots episode (recorded March 12, 2026) examines how the war in Iran is rapidly consuming U.S. missile and munitions inventories, and why that matters strategically and for global supply chains. Hosts Joe Weisenthal and Tracy Alloway interview Tom Carrico, Senior Fellow and Director of the Missile Defense Project at CSIS, who explains what types of missiles and defenses are being used, the physical and political constraints on ramping production, and the wider implications for U.S. deterrence — especially in the Pacific.

Key takeaways

  • The current Iran conflict has produced a very high rate of missile and drone use, producing real risk of depleting U.S. defensive interceptors and offensive munitions — the feared “going Winchester.”
  • Missile defense buys time but does not end threats; absence of interceptors can quickly change strategic calculations.
  • The U.S. is redistributing systems (Patriot, THAAD) from Asia and elsewhere to the Middle East, which reduces capabilities available to deter China or North Korea.
  • Industrial and supply-chain bottlenecks (solid rocket motors, single-source parts, limited facilities and workforce) limit how fast production can be scaled.
  • Political and budget constraints are critical: FY26 appropriations left a reported ~$28.8 billion shortfall for munitions versus Pentagon requests, slowing the planned multiyear ramp-up.
  • The Pentagon and industry are taking steps (prime-company investments, government capital programs, factory builds) but these take years to fully materialize.

Topics discussed

  • Types of missiles and systems in play: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles (including long-range UAVs/cruise-like drones), interceptors (Patriot PAC-3, THAAD), Tomahawk cruise missiles, gravity bombs/JDAMs.
  • Asymmetric dynamics: relatively cheap Iranian UAVs/drones vs expensive interceptors and cruise missiles used by the U.S. and partners.
  • The operational role of missile defense: defensive interceptors to protect population/forces and buy time for other measures.
  • Global demand surge for air and missile defense after Ukraine and other conflicts; Europe’s and Asia’s procurement responses.
  • The U.S. “munitions ramp” plan and how industry and government are trying to accelerate production.

Numbers, examples, and concrete facts mentioned

  • Episode date: March 12, 2026.
  • Large-scale expenditures: hundreds (and potentially thousands) of missiles and interceptors have been used in recent weeks/months.
  • Army changed Patriot PAC‑3 acquisition objective (reported as roughly quadrupling from “~3.x” to “~13.x” in the transcript — i.e., significant increase).
  • Tomahawk production: administrative goal reported to move from ~57 (a small purchase baseline) toward a target of ~1,000 per year (long-term goal announced by industry).
  • FY26 munitions shortfall: roughly $28.8 billion less than the Pentagon requested for munitions.
  • U.S. investments: examples include a Pentagon $216 million investment into Aerojet (production sites in Arkansas referenced) and L3Harris equity moves related to solid rocket motors.
  • Patriot users globally: about 18 countries operate Patriot systems; deliveries have been constrained before to prioritize Ukraine.

Supply-chain and production constraints

  • Key bottlenecks:
    • Solid rocket motor (SRM) production: very few major producers (e.g., L3Harris/Aerojet, Northrop Grumman legacy lines).
    • Sole-source components and limited factories (example: a primary Tomahawk production facility in Tucson).
    • Workforce limitations and industrial capacity near population centers (safety and siting constraints for large explosives/propellant plants).
  • Structural problems in defense procurement:
    • The DOD is a monopsonist buyer; historically cyclic buying patterns discourage industry from large on‑spec investments.
    • Need for multi-year, predictable procurement (the current plan calls for a multi‑year ramp) to justify industry scale-ups.
  • Recent policy/industry actions:
    • Pentagon and Office of Strategic Capital initiatives to attract private capital and prime-company on‑spec investments (Steve Feinberg’s effort to push primes to invest ahead of contracts).
    • Announced production increases from primes (e.g., Lockheed on THAAD and Patriot; Raytheon/other firms on munitions), but contracts and appropriations lag.

Strategic implications

  • Short-term: moving Patriot/THAAD from East Asia to the Middle East reduces immediate deterrence posture in the Pacific; General Charles “C.Q.” Cain’s comment: “we have enough for this conflict” — not the same as “enough for all global tasks” (notably China deterrence).
  • Medium/long-term: if inventories cannot be replenished quickly, the U.S. and allies may face harder choices about where to commit forces/systems and which theaters to prioritize.
  • Allies and interoperability: constrained U.S. production/deliveries complicate plans for allies to “buy American” and for interoperable defenses (some allies may switch systems for schedule reasons — e.g., Denmark opting for SAMP/T vs Patriot).
  • Operational tradeoffs: munitions transition is occurring where possible (moving from long-range standoff Tomahawks toward gravity bombs/JDAMs when air defenses are degraded), but air-delivered effects still have limits without ground confirmation.

Notable quotes & lines to remember

  • “Missiles truly have become weapons of choice.” — Tom Carrico (CSIS)
  • General Cain: “We have enough for this conflict.” (caveat: not enough for multiple global contingencies)
  • Tom Carrico: the specter of “going Winchester” — running out of defensive interceptors.
  • “Missile defense will not win a war for you, but its absence will lose one (or could lose one) pretty quickly.”

What to watch / action items

  • Congressional action: whether and how quickly Congress passes/amends munitions supplemental funding to cover the ~ $28.8B shortfall.
  • Industrial ramp progress: announcements and contract awards from Lockheed, Raytheon, Northrop, L3Harris, Aerojet, and new SRM entrants; progress toward stated production rates (e.g., Tomahawk/Patriot/THAAD increases).
  • Inventory accounting: any official/unofficial disclosure on remaining interceptor counts, Tomahawk stocks fired, and deliveries to allies (including whether Patriot shipments resume).
  • Deployment shifts: imagery and reporting of THAAD/Patriot movements out of South Korea/Japan and impacts on Pacific readiness.
  • Allies’ procurement decisions (schedule vs capability tradeoffs), and continued support to Ukraine and other theaters.

Further reading / follow

  • CSIS Missile Defense Project publications (Tom Carrico’s team) for deeper analysis on missile defense supply chains, inventories, and procurement policy.
  • Follow Tom Carrico (@TomCarrico) and Odd Lots (Bloomberg) for episode notes and updates.

If you want a very short summary: the Iran war is burning through U.S. missiles and interceptors fast enough to reveal real industrial and budgetary constraints. The U.S. and industry have plans to ramp production, but political funding gaps, single-source bottlenecks, and the time required to expand capacity mean replenishment will be slow — with real implications for U.S. global deterrence, especially in the Pacific.